curitiba references

Biosafety Protocol MOP 3 - Collection of references

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The Potential Impacts of the Biosafety Protocol on Agricultural Commodity Trade
Prepared for the International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council by Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, December 2004
Argues that proper identification was way to expensive. Contains interesting data and details.

PRRI - Public Research & Regulation Foundation
A highly active and aggressive pro-GMO initiative of scientists funded by industry and some governments

IFPRI: Assessing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’s Proposed Information Requirements in APEC: A Trade Flow Analysis
A presentation of Mark W. Rosegrant - Director of the International Food Policy Institute - argues that developing countries are largely undervaluing the economic effects of stringent information requirements and claims they will be up to 1-2 bio US $ per year in Asia alone and would create new domestic barrier to entry for transgenic crops.
The presentation is based upon an IFPRI briefing paper by Guillaume P. Gruère: An Analysis of Trade Related International Regulations of Genetically Modified Food and their Effects on Developing Countries

Kym Anderson, World Bank and Lee Ann Jackson, WTO Secretariat: Economic impacts of biosafety regulations on APEC economies
Two representatives of global public institutions make phantastic claims about the welfare impact of GMOs and the future of "Golden Rice" and blame the EU for not allowing the full benefits to arise. Mr Anderson also heads the ag-biotech programme of the Adelaide based Centre for International Economic Studies.

OFFICIAL PAPERS
Audit Report: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism Release Permits
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General Southwest Region, December 2005
A striking account of the US Department of Agriculture itself of its inability to control field trials within the US and the fate of hundreds of unapproved GMO traits released.
This also has substantial repercussions on the US ability to identify GMO traits in exports.
Excerpts:
"Since 1986 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has approved over 10,600 applications for more than 49,300 field sites (...)
We found that APHIS, the USDA agency that oversees biotechnology regulatory functions for the Department, needs to strengthen its accountability for field tests of GE crops. In fact, at various stages of the field test process—from approval of applications to inspection of fields—weaknesses in APHIS regulations and internal management controls increase the risk that regulated genetically engineered organisms (GEO) will inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow without regulation. (...)
We found, however, that APHIS lacks basic information about the field test sites it approves and is responsible for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and what becomes of them at the end of the field test. (...)
Of primary concern, the precise locations of all GE field test sites planted in the United States are not always known. After authorizing field tests, APHIS does not follow up with all permit and notification holders to find out exactly where the fields have been planted
Before approving field tests, APHIS does not review notification applicants’ containment protocols (...)
At the conclusion of the field test, APHIS does not require permit holders to report on the final disposition of GE pharmaceutical and industrial harvests, which are modified for nonfood purposes and may pose a threat to the food supply if unintentionally released. As a result, we found that two large harvests of GE pharmaceutical crops remained in storage at the field test sites for over a year without APHIS’ knowledge or approval of the storage facility.(...)
Specifically, APHIS biotechnologists do not sufficiently document their review process and scientific basis for approving initial field test applications.(...)
Finally, we found that APHIS guidance should be strengthened to prevent the persistence of GE crops outside the field test. (...)
(...) we concluded that APHIS’ current regulations, policies, and procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of agricultural biotechnology."